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Introduction
The macroeconomic e¤ects of budget rules have been studied recently in a number of papers using growth models along the line of Futagami et al. (1993) . In this framework endogenous growth stems from investment in a public capital stock, which also raises the private incentive to invest. Greiner and Semmler (1999) and (2000) incorporate the so-called golden rule of public …nance into this framework. This budget rule allows the government only to run de…cits if those de…cits are used to …nance investments in the public capital stock. Greiner and Semmler (2000) …nd negative long run growth e¤ects of a strict golden rule while a more ‡exible regime that additionally allows interest payments to be …nanced by de…cits yields positive growth e¤ects. Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004a) and (2004b) study long-run welfare implications of the golden rule in the same framework. They show that the golden rule can lead to welfare improvements in contrast to the standard intertemporal budget constraint. An interesting contribution is Minea and Villieu (2005) who study a …xed de…cit budget rule in the same framework and …nd, contrary to Greiner and Semmler (2000) , that a balanced budget always leads to higher long run growth than a …xed de…cit budgetary regime. 1 They solve the model numerically and study welfare e¤ects in comparison to a balanced budget during transitional dynamics. 2 No comparison has been made between a golden rule and a …xed de…cit regime in an endogenous growth framework which is the aim of this paper. The main di¤erence between the rules is that they di¤erently a¤ect the composition of government spending. 3 The golden rule stipulates that de…cits can only be used to …nance public investments whereas a …xed de…cit rule also allows public consumption to be …nanced by de…cits. The composition of government spending in an endogenous growth setting has been studied by Lee (1992) , Devarajan et al. (1998) , Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) , Turnovsky (2000) , Park and Philippopoulos (2004) and Park (2006) . Here, the government can either invest in the public capital stock which is an input in the production function or pay for public consumption goods which increase the utility of private households. By analyzing the optimal composition between the two outlays these studies are normative. The budget is always assumed to be balanced so taxes are the only revenues of the public sector. This paper synthesizes certain aspects of the two streams of literature but it 1 Throughout this paper a balanced budget is considered to be a budget rule that does not allow any structural de…cits.
2 Other notable contributions in that line of research are Ghosh and Nolan (2007) and Greiner (2007) . 3 For empirical …ndings see Poterba (1995) .
1 remains a positive analysis. Including public debt in the aforementioned framework, the aim is to study the impact of budget rules on the composition of government spending and through this channel the impact on growth and welfare. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short description of the budget rules under consideration. In section 3 we lay out the basic model and derive the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4 and 5 analyze the steady state and comparative statics of the …xed de…cit regime and the golden rule respective analytically. In section 6, a simulation is presented of a regime switch from a balanced budget to a …xed de…cit rule and to a golden rule. The steady state e¤ects, transitional dynamics and welfare e¤ects of the two rules are compared. Section 7 concludes.
Budget Rules in Theory and Practice
For the purpose of this paper a budget rule is de…ned as a permanent constraint on …scal policy, typically de…ned in terms of an indicator of overall …scal performance.
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Restrictions on …scal policy are mainly justi…ed in conjunction with political eco nomy considerations. 5 Positive de…cits within a range should be allowed in order to react to cyclical ‡uctuations and to help achieve macroeconomic stability. Budget rules can be classi…ed under de…cit-assignment (asset-related) rules and macroeconomic rules which restrict a certain …scal indicator such as the de…cit ratio. The golden rule of public …nance is a de…cit-assignment rule that only allows de…cits in order to …nance public investments. This rule intends to foster intergenerational equity by equally dividing the burdens and bene…ts of public investments from one generation to the next. 6 Moreover, the golden rule sets incentives for public investments which is especially important when it comes to short-sighted politicians. 7 In practice, the golden rule has a long tradition in Germany. Great Britain implemented a golden rule in 1997.
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Signi…cant examples of rules that …x certain …scal indicators are the Maastricht Criteria of the European Union and the Stability and Growth Pact for the members of the European Monetary Union which set a de…cit ceiling of three percent of GDP and require the total government debt to not exceed 60 percent of GDP. 4 See Kopits and Symansky (1998), p. 2. 5 See, for example, Schuknecht (2004) , for an overview. There are additional justi…cations, see e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1977) . 6 For a discussion, see Mintz and Smart (2006) . 7 See Dur et al. (1997) for a formal treatment. 8 See Kell (2001) . 9 The de…cit ceiling can be breached in exceptional cases, see Amtenbrink et al. (1997) for a 2
The most important rule of the Stability and Growth Pact appears to be the three percent de…cit target because it is regulated on a yearly basis. The other regulations, e.g. the debt target or the requirement to achieve a budget "close to balance or in surplus", are mid-term targets. For this reason we concentrate on a …xed de…cit ratio as the most well-known restricted …scal indicator and compare this to the golden rule of public …nance. The next section presents the basic model through which the rules will be analyzed.
The Model
Before studying the e¤ect of budget rules it is necessary to derive the decentralised equilibrium in the economy without any budgetary regime. The model includes public consumption and public debt in the Futagami et al. (1993) framework. The representative in…nitely lived agent maximizes the discounted sum of utility in the form of:
where is the subjective discount rate and the instantaneous utility u (c t ; c 
;
for 6 = 1 log c + (1 ) log c s ; for = 1:
We denote c and c s as private and public consumption in period t respectively. The parameter is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution S = 1 . For S ! 0 households try to perfectly smooth their consumption so that consumption today and tomorrow become perfect complements whereas for S ! 1 the opposite occurs. The representative households ‡ow budget constraint is given by:
The household uses after tax income (1 ) y to consume c and invest
where k is the rate of private capital depreciation. The household can also buy government bonds b which yield the return of rb. It is assumed that it is not allowed detailed description. For an assesment of the rules see Buti et al. (2003) . The latest reform is described by Buti (2006) . 10 All variables are functions of time. But for convenience the time index is omitted. 11 This form of utility function is also used in Lee (1992), p. 425. 3 to run ponzi-games:
The production function of the representative producer exhibits constant returns to scale with deminishing returns with respect to each other:
The output y is produced with private capital k and the public capital stock g where 0 < < 1 is the elasticity of output to public capital. Population is normalized to unity. The government can use tax revenues y and de…cits _ b to …nance gross public investment _ g + g g; public consumption c s ; and to serve debt obligations rb: As in Futagami et al. (1993) , the tax rate is assumed to be a ‡at tax on output. The government constraint is therefore:
The public capital stock evolves according to:
where i is gross investment and g is the rate of depreciation of the public capital stock.
In the decentralized equilibrium the household maximizes its lifetime utility (1) together with (2) subject to its budget constraint (3) and the production function (5). This leads to the equilibrium growth rate of private consumption c :
From the …rst order conditions one can also derive the net rate of return for private capital r:
A necessary condition for the growth rate (8) to be positive requires the interest 12 The no-ponzi condition corresponds to the transversality condition resulting from the decentralized optimization problem of the households. 4 rate to exceed the time preference rate, r > : For utility to be bounded it is also necessary that:
The no-ponzi condition (4) leads to another restriction that the interest rate needs to be greater than the growth rate of the economy:
4 Fixed De…cit Regime
Fixing the de…cit ratio restricts borrowing but does not earmark the de…cits for a speci…c outlay. The rule can be represented in the following form:
When incorporating public consumption expenditures into the model of Futagami et al. (1993) a crucial assumption is how to divide the revenues between consumption and investment. Here it is assumed, that a constant fraction of the tax revenues is used for net public investment, an assumption often made in the literature:
Public consumption is therefore derived as a residual. Equation (6) together with (12) yields:
In the …xed de…cit regime de…cits are only used for public consumption. Of course, in practice de…cits might also be used to …nance public investments with this rule. The extreme case is selected to outline this rule from the golden rule which allows de…cits only for public investments.
Dynamic System
The equilibrium growth rate of consumption is again given by the decentralized solution (8). The rates of growth for public debt
and public investment
derived from (12) and (13) respectively. The growth rate of private capital can be deduced from (3), (6), (13) and (14) to be:
To solve for endogenous growth solutions, the dynamic system is expressed in terms of the private capital stock. For this we de…ne the following variables:
. The dynamic system of the economy becomes:
Steady State and Comparative Statics
A stationary point of the dynamic system corresponds to a balanced growth path where all initial variables g; b; c and k grow at the same constant rate. Constant steady-state values for c k ; g k and b k are found by setting the dynamic system to zero. From this we obtain two conditions for the long-run growth rate depending on g k . Combining (16), (17) and (8) leads to
Equating (17) and (18) leads to an equation for b k depending on g k . Inserting above, we obtain the relation 1 for the steady-state growth rate. The second condition comes from the Euler equation (8) of the decentralized equilibrium. The steady state conditions are thus:
The …rst condition (19) is the di¤erential equation for the public net investment given by (13). A steady state value for g k must satisfy these two conditions. Steady state values for c k and b k are found by inserting the steady state values for g k and together with admissible parameters for ; ; ; and into the zero set dynamic system. The resulting steady state is locally stable. 15 We are interested in studying the impact of an increased de…cit ratio on the long run equilibrium. Inspecting equations (19) and (20) it is obvious that the de…cit ratio m does not appear in these conditions. It follows that increasing the de…cit ratio has no e¤ect on the long run growth rate nor on the steady state ratio of public capital.
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 An increase of the de…cit ratio in the …xed de…cit regime leaves the long run growth rate une¤ected given that c
What is the reason for this outcome? De…cits in the …xed de…cit regime are only used for public consumption leaving the public capital and thus the growth rate una¤ected. The no-ponzi condition (4) requires the long run interest rate to be higher than the growth rate of the economy in steady state, thus of the growth rate of debt: r > : Hence, long run interest payments on debt are higher than the de…cits. The debt burden is borne by cutting public consumption expenditures instead of public investment, so that even in the long run there is no decremental growth e¤ect present. Of course, growth neutrality of higher de…cits are only possible as long as public consumption expenditures are positive.
Golden Rule of Public Finance
The golden rule is a de…cit-assignment rule prohibiting de…cits to be used for public consumption. It is thus the ultimate intention of this budget rule to in ‡uence the composition of government expenditures. 16 The rule formally states that:
The change of debt over time _ b equals the change of net investment _ g less the fraction (1 ') of tax revenues y which are used to …nance public investment.
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15 See appendix for a proof. 16 See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) . 17 This rule is used by Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004a ), p. 245, Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004b ), p. 630, and Agénor and Yilmaz (2006 , p. 18. It is a variant of Regime (A) in Greiner and Semmler (2000) , p. 368 but with a major di¤erence which will be discussed in this section. 18 The golden rule is modelled as a net investment rule unlike in Germany where gross investments are allowed to be …nanced by de…cits.
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The fraction 0 < ' < 1 is used for unproductive expenditures so that:
Unproductive expenditures consist of public consumption c s , depreciation costs g g and interest payments rb. As in Greiner and Semmler (2000) , the rate of change of public investment is given by:
The parameter ' 1 > 1 determines the level of de…cit …nanced public investment. A value of ' 1 = 1:5 means that one third of net public investment is …nanced by de…cits. Since ' is assumed to be …xed there is a constant fraction ' 1 (1 ') which is used for public investment, analogous to the …xed de…cit regime.
Dynamic System
The rates of growth of the variables form the dynamic system with a golden rule.
Here the equations will immediately be expressed in relation to the private capital stock. The growth rate of public capital from (23) is given by:
Combining the budget constraint of the private households (3) with the golden rule restrictions (21), (22) and (23) yields the growth rate of private capital:
The growth rate of debt is obtained from (21) and (23):
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The dynamic system with a golden rule thus becomes:
Steady State and Comparative Statics
As in the …xed de…cit regime, steady state values are obtained by setting the dynamic system to zero. The Euler equation (8) together with a combination of the zero set dynamic system lead to two conditions of the long run growth rate only depending on the variable g k :
The steady state is again locally stable.
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We now study the impact of higher de…cits in the golden rule of public …nance. This is represented by an increase of the policy parameter ' 1 which results in higher de…cit …nanced public investments. The main di¤erence to the …xed de…cit regime is easily seen from equation (30): While condition (31) is una¤ected by a higher ' 1 the impact on (30) -given the value for g k -is positive:
The comparative static e¤ects are represented in …gure 1. An increase of public investments …nanced by de…cits shifts the 1 (g k )-curve outwards and leaves the 2 (g k )-curve unchanged. The equilibrium moves from G to G 0 ; with a higher growth rate and a higher public capital ratio. This leads us to:
19 See appendix for a proof. 
Proposition 2 An increase of the de…cit ratio in the golden rule of public …nance increases the growth rate given that c
This proposition contrasts previous …ndings of the literature. Minea and Villieu (2005) 20 …nd that higher de…cits for public investment can never increase the long run growth rate. The growth e¤ect in Greiner and Semmler (2000) 21 is not clear cut analytically, however they show a negative impact in numerical simulations. The reason for the opposite outcome compared to Greiner and Semmler (2000) is the parameter ' which is endogenous in their model 22 whereas in our model it is constant. Endogenizing the fraction of tax revenues which are used for nonproductive public expenditures has the following e¤ect: Rising interests because of higher debt accumulation also raises the fraction ' of tax revenues devoted to unproductive expenditures. Consequently public investments fall and the higher debt burden in this case has to be borne by public investments. In our model ' is constant, so for equation (22) still to be met with higher interests on public debt, public consumption expenditures need to adjust. Here, as in the …xed de…cit regime, public consumption is derived as a residual:
Higher interests on debt resulting from an increase in ' 1 lead to lower public con-20 see proposition 1, p. 11. 21 see proposition 1, p. 372. 22 Greiner and Semmler (2000) use the notation ' 0 for ', see equation (20) on p. 370.
sumption expenditures whereby public investments are increased. Consequently, the golden rule substitutes public consumption by public investments in this model. Even though this formulation of the golden rule is used in a variety of papers, the crucial di¤erence of the parameter ' being exogenous or endogenous has not been made clear in the literature so far.
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The central assumption for the results above is that higher debt burdens are served with a cut in public consumption expenditures. Generally, public investments tend to be adjusted due to revenue losses resulting, for example, from an economic downturn. Public investment outlays are disposable in the short run so they can be reduced more easily than public consumption expenditures. However, this is an argument for the short term. Higher interests on debt evolve gradually, reducing the budget in the mid and long run. Assuming consumption expenditures as the adjustment variable in the longer run seems realistic. Figure 2 displays consumption expenditures relative to total government outlays compared to the interest payments as a ratio of total expenditure for the OECD countries from . 24 The …gure indicates that increased interest payments on debt as a percentage of total expenditures were accompanied by a lower consumption expenditure ratio and vice versa. There is no doubt that raising debt obligations also leads to a fall in public investments. 25 However, this paper concentrates on the other extreme of how a government can react to higher interest payments. Additionally, our formulation for the golden rule has been used in a series of papers. Interestingly enough, substituting utility increasing public consumption with productive expenditures has complex welfare e¤ects. These impacts on welfare together with transitional dynamics resulting from positive de…cits is what we turn to in the next section.
Numerical Simulations
To study the macroeconomic e¤ects of the budget rules more clearly we refer to numerical simulations. The base case is choosen to be the balanced budget with a zero de…cit. We analyze steady state e¤ects and transitional dynamics of a transition to a …xed de…cit regime and a golden rule respectively.
Base Case and Calibration
As a reference point we choose the balanced budget which allows no debt or de…cits so that
The budget rules in the model above both have the balanced budget as a special case. The …xed de…cit rule becomes a balanced budget by setting the …xed de…cit ratio to zero (m = 0) while for the golden rule the parameter ' 1 needs to be one (' 1 = 1) which means that public investments are solely …nanced by tax revenues. To compare the …xed de…cit with the golden rule it is necessary to assume the fraction of tax revenues devoted to public investments (see equations (13) and (21)) to be the same in both rules:
Table 1 presents the chosen parameters for the calibrated model. The values are stylized and mainly chosen so that a large range of parameters of the elasticity of substitution are consistent with the solvability condition (11). The value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution S is also used by Turnovsky (2004) and is in the middle of the range of empirical …ndings. 26 The weight factor for public consumption in the utility function (1 ) is in the middle of what is chosen in the De…cit ratio (…xed de…cit) ' = 0:9
Fraction of taxes for non-productive expenditures (golden rule) ' 1 = 1:25
Parameter for de…cit …nanced investments (golden rule)
literature. 27 The output elasticity with respect to public capital is in line with the …ndings of Aschauer (1989) . 28 The rates of depreciation g and k and the investment tax revenue ratio (and 1 ') are broadly consistent with German data. The …xed de…cit rule is studied with a de…cit ratio m of one percent. Correspondingly, the policy parameter ' 1 for the golden rule is chosen to lead to a one percent de…cit. From the condition (21) and (23) this is found by setting ' 1 = 1:25. The private capital in time zero k 0 is normalized to unity. Table 2 lists the steady state values for the base case consisting of a balanced budget, the …xed de…cit and the golden rule. The presented variables are the growth rate ; public capital g k ; public debt b k and private and public consumption c k and c s k all in relation to the private capital stock. The balanced budget leads to a growth rate of = 0:0556 and a corresponding public capital ratio of g k = 0:5775. The values are found by solving the system (19) 27 The weight factor ranges from 0:075 to 0:3. See Baier and Glomm (2001) 
Steady State E¤ects
The public consumption ratio comes from relation (14) or (32) with the chosen parameters. Introducing a …xed de…cit regime leaves the long run growth rate and the publicprivate capital ratio une¤ected, as was expected. The de…cit is only used for public consumption so that there is no long run growth e¤ect. A positive de…cit ratio leads to a positive debt ratio. Private consumption in relation to the private capital stock also increases whereas the public consumption ratio falls in the long run. The latter is due to the fact that debt obligations are served by cutting public consumption.
The golden rule however, exhibits positive long run growth e¤ects; the growth rate increases to = 0:0632 and the public capital ratio g k is also higher. The public debt ratio is now positive and private consumption also increases as a measure of private capital, whereas the public consumption ratio falls. The rise in the ratio of private consumption is more profound than with a …xed de…cit while the fall in the public consumption ratio is less strong. The positive growth e¤ect comes from the fact that with the golden rule the de…cits are used for public investments which boost private investments and the rate of growth of the economy. This e¤ect is even present in the long run because the interests on debt only lead to a fall in public consumption. The increase of private consumption because of higher output and higher returns from government bonds outweighs the increase of the private capital stock, so that the ratio c k also increases.
Transitional Dynamics
The transitional dynamics of a regime change from a balanced budget to a …xed de…cit and to a golden rule respectively is interesting as there are di¤erent short run e¤ects of the variables to be expected than in the long run. Moreover, the e¤ects are very di¤erent between the two budget rules under consideration. The economy is assumed to be in a steady state equilibrium with a balanced budget initially and an unanticipated policy change to a new budget rule occurs at time t = 0:
Numerical simulations of endogenous growth models are usually performed by linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state to study the dynamics of 29 Solving the system (30) and (31) for ' 1 = 1 yields the same result. 14 the linear system. 30 The method over-predicts short run responses of the variables and can lead to huge deviations of the true system. Hence, policy changes might be judged incorrectly. 31 For this reason we use the relaxation-algorithm proposed by Trimborn et al. (2008) which is well suited for endogenous growth models with more than one state variable. 32 6.3.1 Dynamics of the Growth Rates Figure 3 compares the dynamics of the growth rate of public capital g, private consumption c; private capital k and public debt b for the …xed de…cit regime and the golden rule. All growth rates start with the value = 0:0556 and exhibit an immediate jump after the policy change except for the growth rate of consumption which moves gradually after the shock. With the …xed de…cit rule the rates eventually evolve to their initial value while the growth rates with the golden rule all meet at a higher value of GR = 0:0632.
The crucial di¤erence between the two rules is the development of the growth rate of public investment. The golden rule leads to an immediate jump of the rate of growth of public capital and also a higher growth rate in the long run. In the …xed de…cit rule this growth rate slightly falls in the medium run while maintaining the same value in the long run. The movement of the growth rate of private capital is more profound with the golden rule. An increase of the de…cit ratio immediatiely shifts ressources away from the private sector, causing an initial decline in the rate of private investment. This can be seen from equation (15) for the …xed de…cit rule and (25) for the golden rule where the relevant parameters m and ' 1 both have a negative impact on k : Over time the growth rate increases again. With …xed de…cits the rising rate of private capital comes from increased income of the households because of higher returns on bonds. These two e¤ects compensate for each other in the long run. The golden rule however, also leads to the accumulation of public capital and thus higher output, so private capital growth eventually exceeds the initial value. Additional public capital formation also increases the interest rate (see (9)) leading to more consumption and less savings. Thus, the consumption growth rate (8) increases. In the …xed de…cit rule the lower rate of private investment leads to a lower output. This explains the temporary decline of the growth rate of public capital because private capital eventually grows 30 This is done e.g. by Minea and Villieu (2005) and Greiner (2007) . 31 For a comparison of the linearization method and a more complex iteration see Atolia et al. (2008) . 32 All simulations are performed with Matlab 7.0. faster again. Because of the temporarily higher marginal product of private capital the growth rate of private consumption in the …xed de…cit regime is higher in the medium term until it falls back to its initial value. With the golden rule however, the rate of private consumption gradually increases along with the increased marginal products to a higher value. The growth rate of public debt jumps to a very high value of almost 500 percent in the …rst period and diminishes fast to lower values eventually being higher with the golden rule than with the …xed de…cit rule. Figure 4 depicts the variables in percentage of the private capital stock of the two budget rules and compares their dynamics. The public capital ratio g k increases gradually on a higher level with the golden rule, because de…cits were used to …-nance public investments which are also not cut in the long run to meet the debt obligations. In the …xed de…cit regime the public capital ratio raises in the medium term and then falls back to its initial value. This temporary movement is due to the stronger fall of private relative to public capital (see …gure 3). Both budget rules yield positive debt ratios compared to the balanced budget, eventually being a little higher with a …xed de…cit. The trend of the private and public consumption ratios c k and c s k move in equal directions in both rules in the long run. The main di¤erence can be found in the immediate response. The golden rule leads the private consumption ratio c k to an initial jump up while the ratio falls in the …xed de…cit regime. The e¤ect on the public consumption ratio is reversed. Here the ratio jumps up in the …xed de…cit regime and gradually declines with the golden rule. This can be explained with the assumption that de…cits are used for public consumption only in the …xed de…cit regime. With rising debt the public consumption ratio falls to a lower level, because debt obligations are met by lowering public consumption expenditure. Since the debt ratio is higher in the long run with …xed de…cits, the public consumption ratio is eventually lower.
Dynamics of the Ratios
The di¤erent impact of the budget rules on private consumption is more complex. Positive de…cits raise the consumption ratio with both budget rules in the long run but the immediate jump after the policy change in time t = 0 is reversed. The golden rule leads to an initial jump of the ratio while with the …xed de…cit rule the consumption ratio initially falls (see …gure 4). The reason for this di¤erent outcome is as follows: de…cits have two e¤ects on the household's response of present consumption: an intertemporal substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect. The income e¤ect due to returns from government funds is positive for both budget rules. A golden rule additionally increases output, thus, the income e¤ect is higher than with the …xed de…cit rule. The intertemporal substitution e¤ect works in the opposite direction. With increasing interest rates the willingness to save is higher so the substitution e¤ect leads to less consumption today in favor of future consumption. In the short run this e¤ect outweighs the (lower) positive income in the …xed de…cit rule while in the golden rule the income e¤ect dominates. The choice of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution S crucially a¤ects the consumption behavior of households. As mentioned above, the higher the value for S the more the households are willing to substitute consumption tomorrow for present consumption, thus the substitution e¤ect becomes stronger.
Welfare E¤ects
For evaluating welfare e¤ects we need to …nd the paths of private and public consumption from which households get their utility. 33 For getting the net welfare gain of the transition to the new budget rules we …rst need to calculate the utility path when the economy stays in the old steady state with a balanced budget. This is compared with the utility path during transitional dynamics to the new steady state after a regime switch either to a …xed de…cit rule or to a golden rule, both leading to a de…cit ratio of one percent. The private consumption path within the steady state with a balanced budget c zero t is calculated as:
where c zero k and zero are the constant steady state consumption ratio and the growth rate respectively. The public consumption path is found by calculating the time path of private capital with
Multiplying this with the known steady state public capital ratio (c 
Inserting these time paths into the utility function (2) we get the utility path if the economy stays in a steady state with a balanced budget regime:
Lifetime utility is obtained from the integral according to (1) and will be labeled
The adoption of a new budget rule with positive de…cits leads to transitional dynamics so the growth rates of private consumption are not constant anymore. From the simulation we get the time path for the public capital ratio g k to the new steady state which is used to calculate the path of the growth rate with (8). The instaneous growth rates will be accumulated over time. The initial jump of consumption is implicitly de…ned in the …rst value of the capital ratio coming from the simulation which will be labeled as c k0 . The time path of private consumption after a regime switch with positive de…cits c pos t can be calculated as follows: where the growth rate is calculated with the time path of g k inserted in (8).
Again the time path for public consumption is given by (33). Now the time path of the ratio for both rules is calculated with (14) and (32) respectively using the values for g k and b k from the simulation. Private capital k t evolves with:
where the of k s is calculated with (15) and (25) respectively, additionally using the simulated time path for c k . Instantaneous utility is de…ned as in (34) and is labeled pos ) whereas the lifetime utility (1) is labeled U pos . To asses the welfare e¤ect of the de…cit increase we de…ne the present value of net welfare to be:
The total net welfare e¤ect U can be calculated by taking the integral which leads to:
The sign of U provides a criterion to jugde the welfare impact of higher de…cits: if the sign is positive the welfare of the economy is increased. The values cannot be compared for di¤erent elasticities of substitution because the utility level greatly varies. For this reason the total net welfare e¤ect will be presented in a ratio of initial total welfare:
The welfare e¤ects of a reform of the budget rules from a balanced budget with zero de…cits to a …xed de…cit rule with m = 0:01 and to a golden rule with ' 1 = 1:25 are presented in table 3. 35 The net welfare e¤ects of the transition to a …xed de…cit rule are all negative. The lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution S the higher the net welfare loss due to the …xed de…cit regime being up to 2:27 percent with an elasticity of S = 0:1. Welfare e¤ects from a transition to a golden rule are ambiguous. A golden rule leads to welfare losses of 5:87 percent for low elasticities, however this result turns over for higher elasticities. The net welfare gain from a golden rule amounts to 5:53 percent (with S = 1). The turning point for the golden rule is an elasticity of substitution of S > 0:331 for the given parameters. Low elasticity values imply that households treat consumption today and tomorrow as complements. Thus the results indicate that if households have a strong tendency to smooth consumption, the introduction of a golden rule leads to welfare losses in the economy. Only if households are willing to substitute consumption today and tomorrow, introducing a golden rule would be bene…cial. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the net welfare e¤ect resulting from a transition to the …xed de…cit rule 35 The time horizont is chosen to be T = 100 periods. and to the golden rule respectively (see equation (35)). The short run e¤ects are positive for low values of S in both cases but for di¤erent reasons. The positive e¤ect with the golden rule is due to the upward jump of private consumption while with the …xed de…cit rule it is the upward jump of public consumption which outweighs the negative impact from the downward jump of private consumption that is less profound with low S-values. With higher elasticities the short run e¤ect becomes negative for the …xed de…cit rule and remains positive for the golden rule. The main e¤ect on welfare with higher elasticities is due to a much longer adjustment process of the economy. This means that the positive income e¤ect on consumption with the golden rule is much more distinct.
Conclusion
This paper shows growth and welfare e¤ects of budget rules within an endogenous growth model with productive public capital, welfare improving public consumption expenditures and public debt. We compare a …xed de…cit regime and a golden rule of public …nance. For the former it is assumed that de…cits are only used for public consumption while the latter allows public de…cits only for public investments. This comparison points to an important aspect of budget rules: namely their impact on the composition of government expenditures. The transition from a base case with a balanced budget to both of the two rules is simulated. We show that in the long run positive de…cits in the …xed de…cit regime do not a¤ect the growth rate while the growth rate is increased with a golden rule. These …ndings are in contrast to previous studies due to the assumption that rising debt obligations are borne by cutting public consumption instead of investments. This leads to complex welfare e¤ects since public consumption expenditures deliver utility to the private households. Welfare e¤ects from a transition to a …xed de…cit regime are negative. Introducing a golden rule has ambiguous welfare e¤ects being only positive with high elasticities of intertemporal substitution. The results indicate that economies populated by households who have a strong tendency to smooth consumption should maintain a balanced budget from a welfare point of view.
with the interest rate r = (1 ) (1 ) (g The results show two negative and one positive eigenvalue corresponding with a positive determinante of the Jakobian for various elasticities. Hence, the steadystate is saddle-path stable.
Local stability with a golden rule
The dynamic system with the golden rule is given by equations (27), (28) and (29).of the main text. The Jacobian matrix with a golden rule is given by:
with: From this we can calculate the eigenvalues and the determinant which also con…rm saddle-path stability: Table 7 : Eigenvalues and determinant of the Jacobian, golden rule 
